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Murder, Insanity and The Efficacy of Woman's
Role: The Gwendolyn Hoyt Case
by George B. Crawford
hortly before 1 a.m. on 20 September 1957 Gwendolyn Hoyt,
a 32-year-old Tampa housewife, lost any semblance of selfpossession as she flew into a rage and crushed her husband's
forehead and face with a baseball bat. Her subsequent trial for
murder initiated a lengthy series of legal proceedings that highlighted the power of a shared assumption about the role of women
in U.S. society during the 1950's. Despite the emergence of social,
economic and intellectual forces to challenge such a conception,
the notion of a legally sanctioned, prescribed woman's role
informed the treatment of the case by attorneys, judges and
jurors. 1
This notion was not just a tool manipulated by the prosecution. Hoyt's defense team illustrated its compelling pull by focusing on her identity as a wife and mother in fashioning an
exculpatory rationale for her behavior before an all-male jury. Her
lawyers also prepared a claim that Florida state law discriminated
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against Hoyt and other women who faced trials because of its
requirement that females must register for jury service, while not
mandating the same imposition for males. The latter argument
would support appeals before both the Florida Supreme Court
and the Supreme Court of the United States. But Hoyt's ultimate
lack of success in those jurisdictions proved the difficulty of marshalling a victorious gender discrimination argument based upon
the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause in that era. The
judicial branch proved incapable of overcoming the burden of tradition and precedent until after the Hoyt case had been decided.
By then, the political branches of government-state and federal-had already begun the process of dismantling legal barriers to
equal female citizenship rights and obligations.
Just as important as judicial presumption, the evidence
adduced at Hoyt's trial crippled her attorneys' labors to mount an
effective defense. A description of her as a victim of discrimination
was surely accurate as a general statement about the effect of sexbased inequality written into law. But the courtroom sessions
brought into view a woman who seemed to be capable of committing the specific charge against her. Under the bright light of the
discovery process and cross-examination, her attorneys' assertions
that an abnormality in their client's brain created a temporary fit
of insanity unraveled. Moreover, Hoyt's own life history, presented in some detail, undermined key attributes of domesticity and
motherhood the defense team highlighted in their attempts to
save her from a prison term. Confronted by contradictory medical
assessments, damaging testimony from witnesses and other evidence, jurors rejected the argument that she was not responsible
for her actions.
Hoyt first began to explain the circumstances surrounding the
attack on her husband less than three hours after it occurred. An
airman at the MacDill Air Force Base hospital, located nearby
Tampa, telephoned detectives at the city's police department
around 1:50 a.m. on 20 September and informed them that
Clarence Hoyt, an Air Force captain, had been brought by ambulance to the facility for emergency medical treatment. The
patient, bleeding profusely and barely conscious, had suffered a
savage beating. Mter having visited the base and learned that the
patient was unconscious and unable to talk, the detectives traveled
to the place where the ambulance picked him up -the Hoyt
home.
They launched their investigation by questioning
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol89/iss1/5
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The Hoyt home in 1957. The photograph was shot by a Tampa police department
photographer.

Gwendolyn as soon as they arrived. During the interview she confessed that she had bludgeoned her husband with a baseball bat,
providing the weapon to the officers for examination. 2
While there, Detective Al Ford observed what he later
described as "a damp area on the rug in front of the sofa, also on
the sofa [there] was dampness about the area, as if something had
been just washed recently." The pillows and one of the seat cushions were m1ssmg. Hoyt later told the trial court that she had
washed the cushion, the area around it and the rug so that her
eight-year-old son, Douglas, would not see the residue of blood, tissue and vomited material at the scene of the assault. He had not

2.

Transcript of Record of Proceedings (State v. Hoyt), Criminal Court of Record
In and For Hillsborough County, Vol. I, 188-189, 195. The three-volume transcript of the trial is held in the appeal file for Hoyt v. Florida, Florida Supreme
Court, Case Number 29.966, Florida State Archives (abbreviated hereinafter
as TRP); OR; Tampa Tribune, 21 September and 18 December 1957.
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witnessed the traumatic event and was thus unaware of it at the
time, she added. 3
Mter hearing her confession, the officers transported
Gwendolyn to the Tampa police station for a more thorough interrogation. They followed standard practice of the late 1950's by
offering her an opportunity to make a confession without coercion. Their approach, occurring nearly a decade before the U .S.
Supreme Court's ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, was lawful at the
time. They were under no requirement to inform her of a right to
confer with a lawyer before answering questions, to have her own
attorney present during custodial interrogation or to secure the
assistance of a court-appointed lawyer if she could not pay for one.
Hoyt provided them with a handwritten statement. She wrote that
she had struck her husband with the bat while he was lying on the
couch in the family's living room, following an evening meal at a
local restaurant and a social visit at the home of a neighboring couple. The statement also included an explanation for the attack.
She claimed that Clarence had been repeatedly unfaithful but
refused to discuss their marital problems. 4
"We have been having a great deal of trouble in our marriage
and I hoped to talk with him about it before he left the following
morning, but he refused and said not to bother," Hoyt volunteered. When the family dog appeared at a side door, she opened
it so the animal could come inside. As she walked to the door, she
picked up a broken baseball bat that Douglas had previously
brought home "to set outside in the trash," she continued. "It had
been broken before now. I looked in the living room to ask
[Clarence] to talk to me, but he refused and said not to bother
him. I raised the bat to strike his shoulders but instead hit him
n-vo, three blows in the head. Then I immediately called an ambulance and my doctor." 5
Her statement introduced no reason for her action beyond
her dissatisfaction with Clarence's neglect and adulterous relationships. She made no suggestion that her mental health might be
the underlying cause of her outburst. Mter collecting her statement, the officers charged Hoyt with "assault with intent to kill." A

3.
4.
5.

TRP, Vol. I, 196, Vol. II, 206, 298; OR.
Police officers did inform Hoyt of a right to remain silent at the time she
wrote her statement. TRP, Vol. I, 201; Mimndav. Arizona384 U.S. 436 (1966).
TRP, Vol. 1, 203.
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local justice of the peace released her on a $100 bond and she
returned home the same morning. The neighbors who had hosted the Hoyts' social visit earlier that evening joined her at the
house. Bob Fellows, a reporter for the Tampa Tribune, also showed
up and was invited inside. 6
While surgeons at the hospital struggled to save Clarence,
Gwendolyn talked to her guests freely about the assault, even allowing Fellows to interview her. He later wrote that Hoyt made coffee
for her guests and discussed her marriage as well as the evening's
events. Fellows described her as dazed and obviously upset, yet able
to recall the circumstances of the assault in depth. "The room was
dark and I struck out to hurt him," she declared. "If it hadn't been
for that bat, I would have slapped him- and then he would've gotten up and slapped me back and none of this would be." The
reporter added that she had been "overcome by remorse" after the
attack. She called for the ambulance and gave Clarence first aid by
elevating his feet and covering him with a blanket as a basic treatment for shock. 7
Gwendolyn offered Fellows the same explanation for the violent act she gave the police. She related that Clarence "had been
unfaithful with women many times during their married life,"
Fellows wrote . Gwendolyn also told the reporter that she had
divorced him in 1944, two years after they were married, "because
she found him with another woman in their apartment." Despite
such transgressions, the couple had later married for a second
time. The reconciliation had little permanent effect upon their
relationship, she added, for Clarence persisted in his adulterous
behavior. She mentioned no mental disability that would make
her susceptible to violent impulses. 8
Months of poisonous strife preceded the assault. The Hoyt
family had lived in their Tampa home since 1950 and during that
period Clarence had spent his evenings and weekends with his
family. In April, 1956 he was transferred to Homestead Air Force
Base, leaving his wife and son in Tampa. He initially followed his
normal off-duty routine and spent the weekends at home, traveling
back and forth from south Florida. But beginning in March, 1957
these visits became much less frequent. On some weekends he
6.
7.
8.

OR; Tampa Tribune, 21 September 1957.
Tampa Tribune, 21 September 1957.
Ibid.
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would not appear at all; on others he would show up on a Saturday
or even a Sunday, and quickly return to Homestead. Evidence of
yet another extramarital dalliance became apparent when
Gwendolyn had arrived on a recent, unannounced visit to
Homestead. She also began to receive disconcerting telephone
calls. "A woman kept calling [Clarence] at the home," she told
Fellows. Finally, her husband's flat refusal to talk about the difficulties in their relationship after they returned from their neighbors' home triggered an uncontrollable impulse to strike at him.
She told the reporter that her intent was to hit him on the shoulders, but she struck him in the forehead by mistake. 9
Nearly eighteen hours after the assault, Gwendolyn was
informed that Clarence had died. In a moment of reflection, the
tragic consequences of what she had done seemingly left her with
a chastened perspective. "[A]ll I wanted was to love him and have
him love me," she declared to Fellows. "Oh, my poor husband-!
loved him so." She was able to muster advice for the Tribune's readers. "If you become angry," Hoyt said, "think a long, long time
before you let it come to the surface." 10
Local prosecutors moved to charge Gwendolyn with seconddegree murder. She was arrested and taken to the county jail.
Officials subsequently transferred her to Tampa General Hospital
as a precautionary measure because they feared that she might
take her own life. She remained in the care of Dr. Mauricio Rubio,
a local psychiatrist, for the next two weeks. Rubio also treated her
for several weeks after she was released from the hospital. 11
Gwendolyn, with help from friends, contacted two local attorneys-Carl C. Durrance and Charles]. Hardee,Jr.-as soon as she
was charged with murder. Both men immediately agreed to represent her, advising her not to provide police officers with any additional statements. They genuinely sympathized with her plight,

9.
10.
11.

Ibid; TRP, Vol. I, 246, 247-249.
Tampa Tribune, 21 September and 18 December 1957; TRP Vol. II, 218-219,
235. Clarence Hoyt died at 5:26 p.m. on September 20.
Tampa Tribune, 21 and 22 September 1957. The formal charge was made on
3 October. Linda K. Kerber, in No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and
the Obligation of Citizenship (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998) offers an analysis
of the Hoyt case in a broad review of the citizenship responsibilities of females
in U.S. society over time. The scope of her work did not permit a close examination of the evidence mustered for and against Hoyt at her trial or the
police reports.
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accepting the case without expecting to receive any significant payment from their client. Hardee even arranged for Gwendolyn to
live in a garage apartment behind his own residence until the end
of the trial. 12
The defense attorneys adopted a dual strategy in response to
the charge against Hoyt.
As they prepared for trial in
Hillsborough County's Criminal Court, also located in Tampa,
they first developed a constitutional challenge that questioned a
state law provision for selecting jurors. Under its terms, prospective jurors must be chosen from among the total number of eligible voters in each county, with one significant exception. It
mandated that "no female person shall be taken for jury service
unless said person has registered with the clerk of the circuit court
her desire to be placed on the jury list." Durrance and Hardee
seized upon this stipulation as discriminatory in general and an
unfair denial of the opportunity for Hoyt or any other woman
charged with a serious offense to be heard by one or more female
jurors. 13
This strategy raised the same legal principle of equal protection of the law federal courts had already applied to discriminatory statutes affecting Mrican-Americans since the landmark 1954
Brown v. Board of Education case. A powerful civil rights movement
had emerged to pressure government officials at all levels to
remove the legal status of a second-class citizenship for MricanAmericans. Success, though limited as of 1957, raised hopes that
more victories for the cause might be possible in the future. The
movement toward equal protection for racial minorities appeared
to be a model useful for challenges to gender discrimination.l 4

OR; Pat Hardee, former wife of Charles J. Hardee Jr., interview by author, 27
July 2009; Charles J. Hardee III, interview by author, 15 May 2009. A trust,
including proceeds from the sale of the Hoyt home, was created to manage
the family assets for Douglas. The trust operated until 1968. Douglas was sent
to live with Gwendolyn's brother in Georgia. Estate of Clarence Walter Hoyt,
File 42782, Probate, Guardiansh ip and Trust Department, Office of the Clerk
of the Circuit Court, Hillsborough County.
13. §40.01 Florida Statutes ( 1951). (Florida Statutes abbreviated hereinafter as F.S.).
14. 347 U.S. 483 . On the federal courts and the African-American civil rights
movement, see Richard Kluger, Simple justice: The History of Brown v. Board of
Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality (New York: Random House,
1975);James T. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone
and Its Troubled Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
12.
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Meanwhile, dynamic changes which had occurred in the everyday lives of women in U.S. society since World War II belied the old
presumption that their duty involved remaining at home as wives
and homemakers. The drain of male workers into military service
during the war years had forced manufacturing firms and other
businesses to hire females. Their participation in the workforce
continued after the war, particularly among married women. In
1940, for example, 15 percent of married women were employed
outside the home. By 1960 the figure was nearly 30 percent. In that
year 40 percent of all females 17 years of age or older held a job outside the home. The number of working mothers increased by 400
percent between 1940 and 1960. This trend occurred even in the
midst of a marked increase in the birth rate and a popular veneration of motherhood and domesticity in the 1950's. 15
Despite these developments, legal inequality for women was
slow to disappear. The construct of a fixed role for women was a
legally sanctioned force in U.S. society. In the 1908 decision of
Muller v. Oregon, for example, the Supreme Court of the United
States had unanimously asserted that a "woman's physical structure
and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence." Woman, the court
opined, "has always been dependent upon man ... Differentiated by
these matters from the other sex, she is properly placed in a class
by herself, and legislation designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men and
could not be sustained." Such a precedent had not been overturned by the time Hoyt's case was adjudicated. 16
Distinctions between male and female jury service obligations
exemplified the continuing influence of sex-based role assumptions in the Deep South and elsewhere. As of 1945, thirty-one
states permitted women to sit on juries, but fifteen allowed them to
claim an absolute exemption from the duty based upon their sex.

15. Arlene Skolnick, Embattled Paradise: The Arne1ican Family in an Age of Uncertainty
(New York: Basic Books, 1991) 52-54; William H. Chafe, The Paradox of
Change: American Women in the 2(J" Century (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1991) 154-193; Carl Degler, At Odds: Women and the Family from the
Revolution to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980) 418-442 .
16. 208 U.S. 412 at 421-422 . See also,Joan Hoff, Law, Gender and Injustice: A Legal
History of U.S. Women (New York: New York University Press, 1991) 192-228;
Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and Gender: Sex Discrimination and the Law
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universily Press, 1989) 29-50.
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Seventeen states disqualified them from service. By 1961 fortyseven states had declared women eligible for jury duty. Only
Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina refused to recognize
female jury service. Eighteen states, including Florida and the
District of Columbia, accorded women an absolute exemption with
varying procedures. Like Florida, Louisiana and New Hampshire
made the exemption automatic, unless a woman volunteered to
serve. No federal court ruling mandated an end to the practiceP
Just as significant for Hoyt's defense team, the Florida Supreme
Court had demonstrated no interest in revising its previous rejections of challenges to all-male juries. In one decision the court
noted: "It is not contended that juries composed of men would be
less fair to woman defendants than would juries composed of
women. Indeed, experience would lead to a contrary conclusion.
The spirit of chivalry, and the deep respect for the rights of the
opposite sex have not yet departed from the heads and hearts of the
men of this country." Such assertions suggested the difficulty
Durrance and Hardee would face in presenting their argument. 18
They first filed a motion to quash the jury panel selected for
the trial, pointing out that the total jury list compiled by
Hillsborough County's jury commissioners included 10,000
names, with "approximately 10 to 15 women" in it. But the percentage of female voters countywide was 40 percent. They argued
that the statute was contrary to the U.S. Constitution's Fifth
Amendment shield against the deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law, the Sixth Amendment's assurance
of "an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed" and the Fourteenth Amendment's
mandate of a citizen's right to equal protection of the law. They
predicted that Hoyt "will be discriminated against if forced to trial
by a jury with an all male panel who do not have the same passions
and understanding of females and their feelings as other women

17. The state data are from Fay v. New York 332 U.S. 261 (1947) at 289 and Hoyt
v. Florida 368 U.S. 57 (1961) at 62-63. See also, John D. Johnston Jr. and
Charles L. Knapp, "Sex Discrimination By Law: A Study in Judicial
Perspective," New York University Law Review 46 (October, 1971) : 675-747;
Hoff, Law, Gender and Justice, 225-228. The other states offering exemptions
included Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia,
Washington and Wisconsin.
18. Hall v. State 136 Florida 644 (1939); Bacom v. State 39 Fla. So 2d 794 (1949) .
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would have." Under fundamental law Hoyt was entitled "to be
tried by a jury drawn from a list containing 40 % female names,"
the defense lawyers wrote . The names of Hillsborough County
women who should have been eligible "were unlawfully, arbitrarily, systematically and intentionally excluded" from the list.19
A month later Criminal Court Judge Lawrence A. Grayson held
a hearing on the motion. Grayson flatly refused to question the constitutionality of the statute. Although he labeled the law "unwise,"
he said a higher court must address the issue. But the judge also
revealed his personal view of the subject and likely forecast management of the trial while explaining his ruling. "Throughout our
entire history-and while some of our higher courts pay no regard
whatever to tradition, it's something you can't entirely disregardwomen have been treated as superior to men, until they sought to
get equal rights and got brought down to our level," Grayson ruminated. "They are now our equals and no longer our superiors."20
Durrance and Hardee also objected to the procedure by which
the county officials composed the jury pool. They argued that,
aside from the statute's legality, there was no rational basis for the
process followed by county jury commissioners to select jurors for
her case. Following a practice apparently in effect for a number of
years, a courthouse clerk had compiled the jury pool and merely
transferred the names of ten women who had not been called to
serve in the previous year to the 1957 register of qualified jurors.
This transaction not only restricted the possible female juror list to
far less than one percent of the total adult female voters, it also
depended upon the decision of a public employee who was not
authorized to compose such a list. Yet, after having studied the
record, Judge Grayson incorrectly claimed the pool of 10,000
names included 27 percent of the eligible female jurors.
Therefore, "there certainly isn't any discrimination of the nature of
which you complain in terms of percentages of the population," the
judge insisted, and dismissed the challenge. He would show no willingness to entertain contrary arguments at any point in the trial. 21
Once their jury statute argument had been rejected, Durrance
and Hardee set that portion of the defense argument aside for
19. Challenge to jury Panel, 8 November 1957. TRP, Vol. 1, 6, 7-9.
20 . TRP, Vol I, 45-46.
21. TRP, Vol. I, 45; §40.02 F.S. (1951); §909.17 F.S. (1955). The testimony of the
clerk who handled jury pools for the court did not make clear whether she had
randomly selected females names f01·jury service each year or used the same
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reconsideration later, if an appeal became necessary. They shifted
to a depiction of Gwendolyn Hoyt as a woman who suffered from
a form of epilepsy that spawned intermittent bouts of uncontrollable behavior, as well as amnesia that prevented her from recalling the details of these outbursts. Onsets of these epileptic
seizures, intensified by the emotional distress provoked by her husband's chronic infidelity, were periods during which she could not
be held accountable for her actions, they argued. An acute
seizure, erupting just before she attacked Clarence, drove the
woman to a violent act. Therefore, Gwendolyn should be judged
not guilty by reason of temporary insanity.
Long known as a defense of last resort, a successful temporary
insanity plea required maximum legal skill. Florida law prescribed a
test for mental competency that had been largely borrowed from a
19th Century English precedent. Under this standard, a defendant
had the burden to prove the claim. Proof involved showing credible
evidence that the accused person did not know what he or she was
doing and its consequences or, did not know that the action was
wrong. Thirty-three years earlier the Florida Supreme Court had
stipulated that a citizen charged with homicide could be acquitted on
the grounds of insanity only "if he must have been insane at the time
the unlawful act was committed, at the particular moment of the
homicide." The court added: "The question whether the accused
had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing an act
that was wrong, is one for the jury." The primary federal precedent
at the time offered no clear alternative to the Florida legal standard. 22
ones repeatedly. This point was addressed in Brief for Appellant, Hoyt v. Florida,
368 U.S. 57 (1961) 6. Briefs for the U.S. Supreme Court case are available at The
Making of Modern Law: U.S. Supreme Court Rewrds and Briefs, 1832-1978,
http:/ / galenet.galegroup.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/ servlet/ SCRB?bO=Hoyt+v.+Fiori
da (accessed 3 September 2009).
22. Collins v. Florida, 88 FL 578 (1924); see also, §909.17 F.S.; the federal case was
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). Most authorities refer to the standard
involved as the McNaghten test, based upon the 1843 English case of Regina
v. McNaghten. 4 Reports of State Trials, New Series, 1839-1843, 847 (1843); 8
Eng. Rep. 723. See Rita James Simon, The Jury and the Defense of Insanity
(Boston: Little Drown and Co., 1967); Donald HJ. Hermann, The Insanity
Defense: Philosophical, Historical and Legal Perspectives (Springfield, IL: Charles
C. Thomas, 1983). Florida law has continued to treat the insanity plea with
the same standard. For example, in a 2009 case the state supreme court
upheld the death sentence for a confessed killer, despite acknowledging his
"mental illness." The court found that "none of the mental health experts tied
[the defendant's] mental illness directly" to the murder. Ricardo Gill v. Florida,
9
July
Published
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The trial began on December 17, 1957 and continued for
three days. As both sides labored to develop their respective positions, the defense attorneys found themselves undermined by the
testimony of the defendant herself. She blocked the development
of a compelling depiction of her insanity by offering a new version
of the circumstances leading to the assault.
Under direct examination by Durrance, Hoyt expounded
upon the statement she gave to the police officers on the morning
of the assault. She claimed that her husband's treatment of her at
least since the previous March was accompanied by a hostile,
threatening attitude. For example, during one visit at their Tampa
home in July, she said, Clarence "went into a rage and he started
to throw things around in the kitchen and [began] scooping
things off counters and then he went into the living room and was
tipping over chairs and tables and broke our lamps and then he
went into our bedroom and he threw our night stand into the living room . .. " In this torrent of wrath he now took aim at her.
According to Gwendolyn, "he went after me and he tore my dress
off. .. and he threw me from the door on to the bed and he started
to choke me and said he would kill me ... "23
This violent marital conflict magnified her medical condition,
she added. Gwendolyn said she had suffered from epilepsy since
she "19, 20 or 21" and had been taking medication for it since at
least 1945. She explained: "I have it at night and I don't, I don't
have any idea when it's going to happen, and when it does, especially in severe attacks, when I wake up, I don't remember anything
that's gone on before. Everything is vague." Prompted by
Durrance, she pointed out that "Almost always, if I am very, had
any bad situation or upset or trouble, I will have a very bad attack
and more than one doctor has told me to avoid [them] ."24
She told the jury that on the evening of the assault Clarence
was "angry" after they arrived back home from their visit with their
neighbors. "He slammed down on the couch." But, as a du tiful
wife, "I didn't say or do anything" to incite him, she assured her
audience. Gwendolyn also made a key addition to her narrative.
Moments before the fatal blows were struck, she said, "I put on
some perfume and I put on this gown he liked . .. then I came out
into the living room and I walked back and forth so that he could
23. TRP, Vol. II, 276-277.
24. TRP, Vol. II, 277, 279, 281.
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see that I wasn't angry." She hoped to talk with Clarence about the
problems with their relationship, she explained. Clearly evident in
the description was an intent to entice him into lovemaking as a
way of re-establishing a basic emotional connection. But he fired
back with a curt rebuff: "Don't. I won't touch you." She remembered imploring him again to discuss their marriage woes. At that
point, the family dog's barking led her to the side door, past the
baseball bat. She opened the door and allowed the dog to enter
the house. "I saw the bat and I picked it up. I thought I'd put it
into the trash when I put my little doggie to bed. And as I was
going through the back, I heard him speak, and I went in. I didn't want to miss anything he was saying," she continued. "And I,
when I went in there, he turned over and he said, 'Don't bother
me. Get away. I'm going back to Homestead in the morning, and
that'll be the end of it.' That's when I hit him." 25
This additional description of the evening handed the prosecution an excellent basis for positing an alternative narrative. A
rejected wife, unable to let go of a philandering, thoroughly
detached spouse who made clear his intention to divorce her,
acted out of a jealous, emotionally wounded fury, not an epileptic
seizure .
In a cross-examination of Gwendolyn intended to eliminate
justifiable provocation as a motive for beating her husband,
County Solicitor Paul Johnson asked whether Clarence had assaulted her "in any way" or physically injured her on the evening of the
murder. She answered with a clear "No." Pushing further to his
objective, he invited her to agree with the following statement:
''You were not in fear of your life or fear of serious bodily injury."
She agreed that she had experienced no fear of physical harm
from her spouse. 26
Johnson also sought to portray the defendant as a manipulative person, capable of deceit. He asked her whether she had
employed" subterfuge, a rue or a lie" to persuade Clarence that he
should return home on 19 September. She admitted that in a telephone call she told her husband Douglas had been injured in an
automobile accident and was lingering near death in a local hospital. The lie was a tactic to get him to return home. She also related that Clarence became angry upon arriving in Tampa and
25.
26.

TRP, Vol. II, 294-296, 303.
TRP. Vol. II, 302-303.
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finding his son in good health at home. He thus had reason to
spurn her efforts at reconciliation. 27
The prosecutor next moved to lay out sensational evidence
about a late-night tryst Gwendolyn had with another man a week
before the murder. Based upon evidence derived from several witnesses, Johnson was able to outline the circumstances of this date,
despite the defense team's repeated objections to this line of inquiry
as a deliberate attack against Gwendolyn's character based upon
hearsay evidence. Gwendolyn admitted that she had left her house
late in the evening of 12 September to meet a man who was registered at a hotel in downtown Tampa. She did not return home until
around 5:00 a.m. The man she spent time with had ordered a
babysitter to work at the Hoyts' address during this nearly six-hour
period, but used a fictitious name for Gwendolyn. The sitter later
recognized the defendant's photograph in a newspaper article
about the murder and contacted the police. On the stand the sitter
offered confirmation that Gwendolyn did not reveal her true identity either when she left the house or when she returned. The jury
heard an obvious message that the defendant was capable of engaging in an elaborate scheme of deception and was no more faithful
to her marriage than her husband. Judge Grayson allowed the introduction of this evidence because, he said, the defense sought to
establish the defendant's "state of mind" leading up the assault. 28
Prosecutors could have attempted to introduce additional evidence about the defendant's past behavior in an effort to discredit the defense counsel's thesis. Police investigators had interviewed
several residents who lived near the Hoyts, yielding descriptions of
episodes in which Gwendolyn was unable to manage her anger in
everyday circumstances. One neighbor police interviewed said she
faced "a constant row resulting from Mrs. Hoyt's quick temper." A
number of eruptions involved Douglas. Some of them required
police intervention. All apparently occurred in daylight hours or
in the early evening, not during the time period Gwendolyn testified she suffered from epileptic seizures.29
27.
28.

29.

TRP, Vol. II, 304.
TRP, Vol. II, 305-318. Judge Grayson's management's of the courtroom routinely blocked any attempt to suppress such evidence. The impact of this revelation was so obvious that the Tampa Tribune's summary of it formed the lead
paragraphs of a news article published the following day. Tampa Tribune, 19
December 1957.
OR (Supplemental Reports).
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In an effort to paint a picture of Gwendolyn's epilepsy with
authoritative weight, the defense lawyers called to the stand two
physicians who had treated her. Hardee's questioning of Dr. Rubio
would be crucial for the defense strategy. On the stand the physician explained that, based upon his diagnosis, the defendant was
afflicted by temporal lobe epilepsy. This condition could induce a
partial loss of consciousness. He noted that affected individuals
"don't fall to the ground. They don't have convulsive movements.
However, they can perform automatic movements" that "are characterized by impulsiveness, by inability to control one's emotional
impulses in the normal way" for periods ranging from a few seconds
to several hours. Rubio said emotional tension could intensifY the
experience: "The greater the emotional stress, the worse the inability to control the emotional impulse." Mter such an episode, a victim "will have practically no recollection" of it. 30
He also offered a summary of electroencephalograms performed on Gwendolyn in Massachusetts in April, 1947 and one
week after Clarence died. Records of the tests showed that temporal lobe epilepsy had developed during this period, Rubio
declared. Then quoting from a report he had previously submitted to the defense counsel, he stated: "This illness, in addition to
her emotionally immature personality, indicates in my opinion
that at the time of the alleged act, Mrs. Hoyt, if able to distinguish
between right and wrong, was unable to adhere to the right and
lacked the awareness of the consequences of her impulsive behavior."31
Under cross-examination by Johnson, Rubio's previous testimony imploded. He admitted that Gwendolyn possessed a
"detailed recollection" of the events of 19-20 September. He also
acknowledged that the 194 7 electroencephalogram showed that
her brain function was normal. Following up on both this
exchange and testimony Gwendolyn had given earlier, Johnson
30

31.

TRP, Vol. III, 425-426, 428. Dr. Mason Trupp-a physician who also treated
Clarence at the base hospital-had seen the Hoyts a year earlier in his office.
Under questioning by Hardee he said Gwendolyn had begun to stutter some
six months before the attack. This behavior "seems to be precipitated by
excitement and nervousness," Trupp said. But Trupp could not verify that she
had suffered a seizure on the evening of Sept. 20. He recommended that a
physician who examined her at the time of the incident address the question.
His inconclusive response, offered earlier in the trial, magnified the importance of Rubio 's testimony. TRP, Vol. II, 330, 334.
TRP, Vol. III, 440.
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asked the physician if, in his treatment of the defendant, he had
learned of "any overt, hostile assault having occurred upon another person." In a stunning revelation, the psychiatrist said that in
1947, Gwendolyn had assaulted Clarence and another woman
when she apparently caught them in a romantic embrace. "I
understand it was with a knife on the woman she found with her
husband in the apartment," Rubio sputtered. The incident
occurred within a month of the date of the original electroencephalogram that showed her to have a normal brain function.
Jurors could not have missed the implication that, even before she
had any symptoms of epilepsy, Gwendolyn was capable of flying
into a spasm of violent rage if Clarence turned his attention to
another woman. 32
After a flurry of questions designed to expose the limits of the
medical practitioner's diagnosis, Johnson arrived at his end point.
"So, in your opinion, she did not have a seizure?" he asked. The
physician replied: "That's correct. It would have comprised a
longer period of confusion, of inability to remember accurately, in
all probability." A few minutes later, Johnson pulled the string.
He leveled the question everyone in the courtroom had been
expecting. "Dr. Rubio," he asked, "have you ever seen any indication of insanity on the part of Mrs. Hoyt?" The witness replied:
"No, sir." Rubio also acknowledged that he had treated her on 20
September for depression, not epilepsy. 33
For their part, the defense attorneys emphasized Gwendolyn's
acceptance of her position in the family, despite her husband's
cruelty in exploiting her affections while indulging in a "double
life" of serial adultery. Prosecutors, Hardee declared, "had no
case" and sought "to inflame your minds against this woman" with
details of the 12 September meeting with another man.
Gwendolyn Hoyt would suffer the rest of her life because of the
way her affliction flared in a few bizarre moments. "She killed the
man she loved-that she had loved all her life," he said. "She had
never loved another." 34
32.

TRP, Vol. II, 245; Vol. III, 448-449. Durrance had previously asked his client if
she had ever been convicted of a crime. She said she had-without identifying
the offense. Thus, an attempt to parry in advance any accusation that the defendant was not fully truthful on the stand ultimately failed to advance her cause.
32. TRP, Vol. III, 445-447, 449-450.
34. Supplement to Transcript, Case Number 29.966, 7, 9-10. (Florida State
Archives).
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Hardee encouraged the jury to consider all of her actions during the evening of the attack. Clarence told her to let the family
dog come into the house. "As a dutiful wife should, she went and
let the little dog in and when she did, she saw this splintered bat."
She was "afraid her child would splinter his hands and took it and
started to throw it out in the garbage." Gwendolyn was "unconsciously holding the bat," hoping "as a last resort, to get him into
bed with her. .. and maybe then they could straighten out their
marital troubles." Then, "what did he do?" Hardee asked. "He
said: 'I'm not going to touch you." The attorney, following up with
a dramatic pause, issued an open question: "Gentlemen, is there
any truth in the words that Hell hath no fury like a woman
scorned?" Finally, in a novel completion of his argument Hardee
insisted that her action on 20 September was something Clarence
had deliberately provoked over many months. Here was a man
whose neglect of his wife included an intentional purpose. "He
knew what he was doing ... Deliberately did these things to this
woman. Deliberately created a situation that he knew would cause
her to react in a way that she did." 35
Carl Durrance pointed out that the defendant had cleaned up
the area around the couch and remained at home while Clarence
received medical care at the base hospital. She did so to care for
Douglas. "Now, I ask you, what kind of decision is required from
a conscientious mother" in that situation, he asked the jury.
"Protect her son. That was her first thought. Now, isn't that a
good mother?" Like Hardee, he characterized Gwendolyn as a victim who had to "suffer the tortures of Hell when minute by
minute, hour by hour, day by day, her husband was forsaking her."
Clarence was an abusive, willfully neglectful husband whose constant failure to take care of his wife "who was sick, looking out for
his baby" would "drive even a normal person to distraction and
insanity." 36
Following the defense counsel's summary, Pauljohnson highlighted the futility of the Hoyts' marriage and the effect of rejection. Clarence had already given up on their relationship;
Gwendolyn could not. She "became enraged because he had

35.

36.

Supplement, 9-10, 19. The quote is from Act III, Scene 8 of William
Congreve's The Mourning Bride (1697): "Heaven has no rage like love turned
to hatred, Nor Hell a fury like a woman scorned."
Supplement, 28-29, 30, 40, 54, 57.
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spurned her, had offended her ego, had offended her vanity
because she was dressed up in this negligee and he refuses to go to
bed with her," Johnson intoned. He turned Hardee's reference to
"Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned" as an advantage. The
defense attorney had correctly characterized her motivation, he
said with approval. "Can you imagine how that must have struck at
her vanity, at her ego, as he refused to go to bed with her?" As a
result, "she picked up the bat and intentionally-intentionally,
heaped blow after blow on his head."
He reminded the jury that both Dr. Rubio and another physician had been called to the stand for testimony about the defendant's mental condition. Neither physician could attest that she
was insane at the time of the assault-a key point under the provisions of state law for determining whether she should be treated
rather than punished. "There has been testimony that she is emotional, but that is not an excuse for homicide," Johnson argued.
"We have a situation in which a woman, because she becomes
angry, suddenly appoints herself executioner and snuffs out the
life ... of her husband, of the father of her child." 37
With that oration completed, the lawyers' courtroom jousting
ended. In his charge to the jury Judge Grayson explained the basis
for an insanity verdict. To find the defendant "not guilty on the
grounds of insanity," he instructed, the members must "believe
that at the time of the assault she was under such defective reason
from disease of the mind as to not know the nature and quality of
the act she was doing." Or, they must conclude that "she did not
know what she was doing was wrong, or that if she knew the nature
and quality of the act and did not know it was wrong, that she was
under such duress of mental disease as to be incapable of choosing
between right and wrong." A "reasonable doubt" about the defendant's capability of making such judgments or "being unable to
resist doing the wrong" would be "sufficient to acquit." Grayson
then ordered the jurors to retire and arrive at a verdict. 38
Thirty-two minutes later, they returned with a unanimous decision. They found Gwendolyn Hoyt guilty of second-degree murder. 39
Over the next few weeks the defense team sought to obtain a
new trial, based upon the original challenges to the jury panel, the
37. TRP, Vol. III, 567, 580.
38. TRP, Vol. III, 589-590, 591.
39. TRP, Vol. III, 596-597.
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verdict options given to the jury and claims that the judge erred
"respecting the admission or exclusion of evidence and testimony," allowing "the prosecutor to attack the character of the defendant." Grayson denied their motions. On 20 January 1958 he
sentenced Hoyt to 30 years in state prison. 40
Her lawyers promptly appealed to the Florida Supreme Court,
challenging the state statute on the grounds that it denied Hoyt an
impartial jury. They acknowledged that federal courts had not
specifically overturned the state's traditional power to exclude "an
entire class of citizens (such as females) from jury service." But,
they pointed out, "recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court regarding Negroes have cast some doubt upon the present
validity of these decisions." Desegregation cases decided since the
early 1950's raised important questions about the legitimacy of
excluding a class of citizens such as women. The Florida legislature had already declared females to be qualified for jury service.
How could lawmakers constitutionally "restrict their eligibility to
perform such service in any unreasonable, capricious manner?"
the lawyers asked. "It could scarcely be contended that the
Legislature might validly place the same restriction upon the eligibility for jury service of males-or of Negroes." 4 1
To buttress their assertion, Durrance and Hardee cited several U.S. Supreme Court rulings involving the selection of juries. In
Ballard v. United States, for example, decided in 1946, the Court
took up a challenge to jury selection for a federal judicial district
in which women were excluded. The decision, written by Justice
William 0. Douglas, struck down the practice. "The system ofjury
selection which Congress has adopted," Douglas wrote, required
that 'juries in the federal courts sitting in such states would be representative of both sexes." Federal juries must reflect "a cross-section of the community." Not every social, religious, racial or
political group must be represented in all such juries, but the selection must be conducted "without systematic and intentional exclusion of any one group." In a general dictum Douglas noted that
"the two sexes are not fungible" and that a reciprocal, "subtle interp lay of influence" was created by having both sexes participate
j ointly in civic duties. When one group of citizens is excluded,
40
41.

TRP, Vol. III, 601 , 607-608.
Appellant's Brief, 28 August 1958, Hoyt v. FliJrida. Florida Supreme Court Case
Number 29.966. (Florida State Archives) .
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Gwendolyn Hoyt's image from her official Florida Department of Corrections file.

"The injury is not limited to the defendant-there is injury to the
jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large,
and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our
courts." His opinion suggested a future application of the same
principle to state courts would be forthcoming.42
In the 1954 case of Hernandez v. Texas the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that a Mexican-American man's conviction for murder
should be overturned because citizens of Hispanic ancestry had
been excluded from local jury service for at least 25 years.
Accepting his attorneys' pretrial motion to quash the indictment

42 . 329 U.S. 187, 192-193, 195; Appellant's Brief.
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against him and the trial, the Court found that the 14th
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause mandated a new trial with
a revised jury selection procedure. In his opinion for the Court
Chief justice Earl Warren wrote: "When the existence of a distinct
class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that the laws, as written or applied, single out that class for different treatment not
based on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the
Constitution have been violated." Durrance and Hardee argued
that the two decisions verified their claim. 43
The state's lawyers countered the proposition that the statute
violated the federal Constitution by pointing out that the U.S.
Supreme Court had not applied the provisions of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments to the states. A dictum issued in the 1879 case
of Strauder v. West Virginia, they emphasized, continued to articulate the rule of law. According to that statement, the federal
Constitution "does not in effect prohibit the state from denying
women the right to serve on juries," they wrote. Hoyt's position
was really a "claim that the absence of women on the jury panel
deprived her of the right to a trial by an 'impartial jury."' But, they
continued, "An 'impartial jury' is not denied by the absence of
women from jury duty. The quality of "' [i] mpartiality' is a state of
mind."
Attorneys for the state also discounted Hoyt's challenge to the
procedure followed for juror selection. The defense, they contended, had "not shown that the jury Commissioners' actions were
unlawful." In addition, the evidence introduced at the trial about
Gwendolyn's date a week before the murder was properly submitted. "Since she sought to establish by her testimony [her husband's] peccadilloes, and, perhaps even more important, her own
conduct in response thereto, the door was left open for impeaching her conduct," they wrote. 44
In a ruling announced on November 7, 1959 the Florida
Supreme Court dismissed the chief defense argument by focusing
on the lack of any U.S. Supreme Court decision striking down a
differential requirement for female jury service. Justice E. Harris
Drew, writing for the court, asserted that the federal tribunal had
not "overruled a legislative determination, or declared invalid a
43.
44.

247 U.S. 475, 478 (1954); Appellant's Brief.
Appellee's Brief, 10 October 1958, Hoyt v. Florida. Case Number 29.966.
Emphasis in the original document.
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constitutional provision, that women as a class should be subject to
different treatment or regulations, such as those here involved,
with respect to jury service." Existing law only prohibited singling
out "a class for different treatment 'not based on some reasonable
classification' or basis."45
A jury qualification law that distinguished between men and
women was intended to avoid placing "unwarranted strain upon
the social and domestic structure" of the nation, Drew wrote. The
"unwilling participation by those whose conflicting duties" could
"affect the quality of their service as jurors" and would harm the
criminal justice system. The distinction based upon sex embodied
a reasonable classification. "Whatever changes may have taken
place in the political or economic status of women in our society,"
Drew declared, "nothing has yet altered the fact of their primary
responsibility, as a class, for the daily welfare of the family unit
upon our civilization depends."
He also failed to discern any merit in the counsel's objection
that the method followed by county officials to compile a jury list
violated the statute. There was no evidence of "anything resembling a systematic exclusion of eligible female voters," Drew insisted. The law permitted the use of clerical assistance; it did not
mandate "more than the personal supervision and review exercised by the commissioners in this case." 46
Hoyt's defense team immediately began work to file an appeal
.
But her loyal Florida attorneys
with the U .S. Supreme Court
would not take the lead role in the case at this stage. Hardee and
Durrance had already devoted more than two years of pro bono
service on behalf of their client. Revenue needs of their respective
firms persuaded them to leave the oral argument to another practitioner. 47
Through intermediaries, including staff members at the
Florida chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, Herbert
Ehrmann, a Boston attorney, was identified as the new lead counsel. Ehrmann and other volunteers prepared briefs that highlighted trends apparent in the U.S. Supreme Court cases since 1945.
45.
46.

47.

Hoyt v. State, Fla. So. 2d 691 at 692 (1959) .
Hoyt v. State 696. Justice Drew also dismissed other procedural and evidentiary
objections raised by the defense. The lone dissenter, Justice T. Frank Hobson,
expressed the same gender role assumptions apparent in other judicial
responses to the case. See Hoyt v. State, 697, 698-699, 700, 701.
Pat Hardee interview.
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The Strauder dictum "must be accepted for what it is-namely, an
illustration applicable to the American society of 1879," they wrote.
"It was not a Constitutional mandate for all time." In response to
"changing moral and factual circumstances," the Court's decision
making had also been revised. A series of cases, including
Hernandez, reaffirmed that "the equal protection clause extends
beyond discrimination on grounds of race and color. " In their
view the "cross-section of the community" rule formulated in
Ballard should become a mandate for all states. 48
The defense team called attention to the increasing numbers
of married women who were working outside their homes by the
late 1950's. Openly contesting Justice Drew's observation, they
proclaimed: "There is no factual basis today for the assertion that
jury service for women places 'an unwarranted strain' upon society." The Court must address current social conditions, they insisted. "It is the facts of 1957, and not of 1866, which govern the equal
protection clause." But they also played the sex role card. They
cited sociological studies that identified differences between man
and women while deliberating on juries. These studies, the
authors wrote, show that "Women tend to play the role of mediators. And to break tensions more than men." What was more
important, "Such voting patterns are particularly evident in cases
involving the home and juveniles." Ajury consisting of both men
and women might possibly have voted to acquit Hoyt. 49
A final segment of the main brief emphasized that even if the
Florida statute was upheld as constitutional, the defendant
deserved a new trial because the procedure to create jury pools in
Hillsborough County violated state law. The number of potential
female jurors selected for 1957 was determined without regard to
the overall pool of women who had registered their willingness to
serve.50
Ehrmann presented the argument for the defense at the hearing. He had built an impressive legal career as a volunteer public
service lawyer, including duty as one of the defense attorneys in
48. Brief for Appellant, H(J]t v. Florida 368 U.S. 57 (1961) 12, 14. On the preparation of the brief, see Rowland Watts to Howard W. Dixon, 13 January 1961 ,
Rowland Watts to Judge Dorothy Kenton, 24 July 1961. American Civil
Liberties Union of Florida Records, P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History,
University of Florida.
49. Brieffor Appellant, 16, 19, 20; ACLU Brief, H(J]t v. Florida.
50. Brieffor Appellant, 21.
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the Sacco-Vanzetti trial. Despite his previous legal experience,
Ehrmann may not have been the most effective advocate before
the tribunal. He had only appeared before the U.S. Supreme
Court once before the Hoyt case. Perhaps just as significantly, he
uttered what apparently was a nervous laugh-close in sound to a
staccato chuckle-that accompanied both his prepared presentation and his responses to questions from the Justices. Listeners
could understandably interpret this mannerism as a condescending sneer. 51
At the Supreme Court hearing, held on October 19, 1961,
Ehrmann characterized Gwendolyn Hoyt as "an epileptic with
damage to her brain and she went out of control." He admitted
that "We don't know what women would have done on that jury.
But shouldn't she have had a chance of having a woman on the
jury who would have said: 'Now, wait a minute. The woman saw
her home, her husband and father of her child going?"' he asked.
"Wasn't she entitled to have people who think like that on the
jury?"
The attorney appealed to a Justice who might be willing to support his reasoning by referring to the sociological studies cited in
the defense brief. These materials, said Ehrmann, "tend to back
up Mr. Justice [William 0.] Douglas's statement [in his Ballard
opinion] that men and women are not fungible-that women
emphasize more the home, children and family. Their approach
is more emotional. They are mediators rather than aggressors in
discussion." He added parenthetically, "I don't think these studies
tell us anything we don't know. They tend to corroborate the obvious." In doing so he applied the gender construct other principal
participants had invoked in the case. 52
The Court must address the 'justification" of the Florida
statute, Ehrmann continued. He pointed out that even the trial
judge, "who apparently belongs to the old school," found that it
was a "silly statute." The Supreme Court as well as lower tribunals
"have been bringing the Constitutional question of the selection of
51.

A recording of the oral argument in Hayt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) is available online at The Oyez Project, http: / / oye z.org/ cases/ 19601969/ 1961 / 1961_31 (accessed 4 September 2009) . (Recording abbreviated
hereinafter as Hoyt Oyez); Kerber, No Constitutional Right, 165; Herbert B.
Ehrmann, The Untried Case: The Sacco-Vanzetti Case and the Morelli Gang (New
York: Vanguard Press, 1933).
52. Hoyt Oyez.
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juries abreast of the times," he asserted. "In the Hernandez case,
which firmly states that if a defendant is a member of a class which
is excluded and there is no justification for it, it is a denial of equal
protection. That is the situation we have here." In response to a
question from Justice Felix Frankfurter about whether the voters
of Florida had actually endorsed the statute because they had not
called upon their legislative representatives to repeal it, Ehrmann
admitted he did not know the answer. "But it seems to me," he
quickly retorted, "we should not justify a 20th Century anachronism
by justification that might have been valid a hundred years ago."
Apparently losing his focus, Ehrmann retreated from his central
claim by adding: "I am not urging the right of women to serve on
juries. I am here defending a woman who was sentenced to 30
years at hard labor without benefit of having women on the jury."53
In concluding comments he repeatedly emphasized that
regardless of the statute's constitutional validity, the administration of jury selection by county officials was improper, if not
incompetent. "But it is no excuse for the behavior of the jury commissioners who arbitrarily limited what little chance there was" for
women to serve as jurors, Ehrmann declared.54
Perhaps the bluntest use of gender construction in the case
appeared in the oral argument by Florida Assistant Attorney
General George R. Georgieff. Referring to Strauder v. West Virginia
as the main precedent for the dispute, Georgieff said the Court
had rendered the decision "because of classic differences that no
attainment can change. They are women because they are women.
They have functions to perform that no ascension up the scale can
make any difference. They bear our children. They are the ones
that rear them, not the men," he proclaimed. "This is their function."55
The statute did not exclude women, Georgieff declared.
Before the law was adopted, women could not serve on juries in
Florida. Therefore, the registration procedure actually created a
civic opportunity that did not exist prior to its adoption. The difference was availability, not eligibility. Women simply had domestic functions to perform and the legislature recognized this fact. In

53.
54.
55.

Ibid.
Ibid. Ehrmann also pointed outjudge Grayson's error in stating the percentage of women registered for jury service in Hillsborough County for 1957.
Hoyt Oyez.
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Strauder the U.S. Supreme Court had likely understood "that to
require them to serve in this capacity [as jurors] would make it difficult for somebody to raise these children, to prepare the food, to
keep the home and to do the other things that women customarily do." In his view, "This is, unfortunately, a man's world and for
some time, I am afraid, it's going to remain one." 56
Although several Justices-including Chief Justice Earl
Warren-repeatedly posed questions about the restrictive effect of
the statute during the hearing, most accepted its Constitutionality
during their conference held a day later. Frankfurter, for example, argued that the Ballar-d and Hernandez precedents called for an
affirmation of the state court ruling. The law did not keep women
from serving on juries because those who wished to do so could
register to serve, as the law provided. For that reason there was "no
systematic exclusion of any part of the base ... there was not systematic exclusion of women here," Frankfurter stated. Warren, Justice
Hugo Black and Justice William 0. Douglas voiced an opposing
view. As they analyzed the statute, the necessity of registering to
become an eligible juror was a discriminatory requirement
because it applied to women alone and the results of its application were obvious. The law restricted the number of females eligible to serve in Hillsborough County's juries to a tiny fraction of the
general female population. As Warren explained, "in this case Fla.
limited women['s] service to 1/10 of 1 percent of the count-that
is tantamount to taking them out." But they were unable to persuade any other colleagues to join them. 5 7
The Court announced a unanimous opinion on November 20,
authored by Justice John Marshall Harlan. His assumption that
women occupied a particular place in society echoed the Court's
1908 Muller ruling and formed a basis to dismiss the constitutional
challenge with a few brief paragraphs. Harlan found that the case
did not require an assessment of the Strauder dictum because the
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Ibid. The state's brief claimed that Florida law made women eligible for jury
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Appellee, Hoyt v. Florida, 6.
Conference notes dated 20 October 1961. Box 1269, William 0. Douglas
Papers, Library of Congress. My transcription of th e conference remarks written by Douglas differs from o nes found in Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief: Earl
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University Press, 1983) 400-401 and in Kerber, No Constitutional Right, 178.
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statute in question did not bar women from serving on juries. A
1957 congressional revision of U.S. law making women eligible for
federal jury duty was not relevant, either. "Even were it to be
assumed that this question [the Strauder dictum] is still open to
debate, the present case tenders narrower issues," he wrote. The
state had not violated the Hernandez standard of a "reasonable classification" by exempting women from jury pools. They could
choose to serve by formally declaring their interest in doing so.
"Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and protections of bygone years," he observed, "and their
entry into many parts of community life formerly considered to be
reserved to men, woman is still regarded as the center of home and
family life." Based upon this presumption, "We cannot say that it
is constitutionally impermissible for a state, acting in pursuit of the
general welfare, to conclude that a woman should be relieved from
the civic duty of jury service unless she herself determines that
such service is consistent with her own special responsibilities." 58
In a second section of the opinion Harlan denied that the
compilation of a jury list by county officials raised any question of
impropriety. "[T] he disproportion of women to men on the list
independently carries no constitutional significance" because
there was no evidence that "Florida has arbitrarily undertaken to
exclude women from jury service," he wrote. The jury commissioners' reliance upon a clerk to create the list was not, in itself, a questionable procedure, Harlan added. 59
Warren, Black and Douglas decided to issue a separate, twosentence concurrence that ignored the Constitutional question
raised by Hoyt's attorneys. "We cannot say from this record that
Florida is not making a good faith effort to have women perform
jury duty without discrimination on the ground of sex," they
declared. With this lifeless statement the trio left open the possibility that they might reconsider the matter in a subsequent case.
The Court's reluctance to examine the merits of Hoyt's appeal
was all the more striking given that less than four months later a
plurality of the Justices would extend the same shield her lawyers
invoked for her to urban voters in a landmark decision overturning both precedent and more than 150 years of practice. In Baker
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v. Carr a majority would determine that mal-apportioned state legislatures denied equal protection of the law to urban voters and
thus required judicial intervention. William 0. Douglas may have
best exemplified the dualism in the court's thinking. Despite his
statement in Ballard that juries must be seated "without systematic
and intentional exclusion of any one group," Douglas was unwilling to lobby his colleagues over the Hoyt case with the same industry he applied to the legislative apportionment dispute. The Court
had originally heard oral arguments in the latter case in April
1961. A re-argument was held in October of that year- a month
before the Hoyt hearing. But as of March, 1962 the Court had not
yet issued a decision in Baker. Douglas was so intent upon obtaining one that he scribbled a private message to his colleagues urging quick action. No recipient could have failed to understand the
thoroughly politicized message, or its patronizing tone. "This is an
election year," he noted. "If the lower court is to have an opportunity to act, the case should be disposed of soon. In other like situations the case has reached us so late that we have been powerless
to act. I am sure there is no one here who wants to produce that
result." 61
In the words of one scholar, the Court's response to
Gwendolyn Hoyt's appeal "showed the helplessness of equal protection in the non-race context" during the early 1960's. "Hoyt is
thus a useful reminder that the Court does not create social movements; it responds to them." The Court would not address a gender discrimination case again until after Earl Warren retired from
the bench. 62
Meanwhile, the assumption of a prescribed role for women
gradually lost its influence over everyday life. Prescient observers
forecast that reforms would eventually force officials in Florida and
other states without open juror eligibility to change existing law.
Six days after the opinion was announced, an editorial writer for
the Washington Post predicted that the ruling "is not likely to be
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[the court's] last word on the subject of women serving on juries."
According to the editorial, a future case, framed in precise terms
that challenged the Strauderdictum, would lead the Court to reject
it. "The most enlightened jurisdictions," the author wrote, "now
make women as welcome in the jury box as they are in the voting
booth." 63
In what would be an empty victory for Hoyt and her lawyers,
an emerging popular call to end sex-based discrimination in law
would soon produce change in both Congress and the Florida legislature. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 signaled the central government's endorsement of female equality before the law. In 1967
state legislators rescinded the special jury registration requirement
for women by overwhelming majorities in both houses-without
direct prodding from a legal case. The U.S. Supreme Court would
finally strike down such laws for female jury service in 1975. Hoyt
v. Florida was thus anything but a lasting precedent. The casefrom the trial through the appeals process- holds significance
both because of its reflection of assumptions about the role of
women held by the male jurists and attorneys who participated in
it, as well as the judicial blessing of gender inequality. 54
Defeated at her last appeal, Gwendolyn Hoyt was committed to
state prison in December, 1961. She was released on parole in
July, 1964, after having served less than three years of her sentence.
Ironically, her early parole would not have been available in the
late 20th Century. Beginning in the 1980's the Florida legislature
embarked upon a major initiative to establish uniform sentencing
guidelines, eventually adding mandatory periods of incarceration.
If Hoyt had been found guilty under the new system of sentencing
adopted by 1995, she would have been incarcerated for at least 85
percent of her prison term. 65

63.
64.

65.

Washington Post, 26 November 1961. See also, editorial in New York Times, 21
November 1961.
Chapter 67-154, Laws of Florida, Vol. 1, Part I (1967); Journal of the Senate of
the State of Florida (1967) 328; Journals of the House of Representatives, Vol. I
(1966-1967) 815-816; Taylor v. Louisiana 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Hoff, Law,
Gender and Justice, 226-228; Rhode, Justice and Gender, 49-50.
Chapter 921 F.S. (1997, 2009); Roger Handberg, "The Florida Courts:
Change a nd Adaptation," in Robert]. Kluckhorn, ed., Government and Politics
in Florida (Gainesvi lle, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1991) 192-212; Florida
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But the verdict she received might have been different in a
courtroom 35 years later. According to the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, in the late 20th Century women convicted of uxoricide by
either a judge or a jury were five times more likely to be acquitted
than husbands. In addition, women tried for murdering their husbands in the late 1980's were at least thirty percent more likely to
be acquitted than they had been in the early 1950's. U .S. Justice
Department researchers combined the trial results with prosecutors' records and found that "wife defendants were more likely
than husband defendants to have been severely provoked by their
spouse" into violent actions. Alas, this was just the point Hardee
and Durrance tried to make the Hillsborough County jury understand.56
Of course, there is no guarantee that a latter-day jury would
have acquitted Gwendolyn Hoyt. But, regardless of the evidence
presented, her chances of receiving a lighter sentence, if not an
acquittal, would certainly have been greater if the same forbearance had been applied to her case. She had the sorry fate to
defend herself against a charge of killing her husband in the
wrong era.
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